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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, cases arising at the interface between
intellectual property rights (“IPRs”) and antitrust/competition law
(“the Interface”) seem invariably related to subject matter which
pre-existing IPRs have expanded to encompass.1 These have
sprung from technological advances, as well as the purported need
to preserve the ability of owners to take advantage of their
investments, and thereby their incentives to innovate for the benefit
of society.2 The growth of IPRs has occurred despite doubts that
have been raised as to the force of these justifications fuelling its
growth.3 As IPRs are strengthened, lengthened, and expanded over
new categories of works, a concern arises that intellectual property
(“IP”) owners have an unprecedented ability to distort competition
in the marketplace.4 At the heart of the Interface arguably lies the
issue of refusals to license.5
1

These cases include IPRs over databases and software. See United States v.
Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Attheraces Ltd. v. British Horseracing Bd.,
[2007] EWCA (Civ) 38 (Eng.) (horseracing data); Case C-241/91, Radio Telefis Eireann
v. Comm’n, 1995 E.C.R. I-743 (television program schedules); Case C-418/01, IMS
Health GmbH v. NDC Health GmbH, [2004] E.C.R. I-5039 (German pharmaceutical
market data); Case T-201/04, Comm’n v. Microsoft, 2004 E.C.R. II-4463.
2
It has been argued that digitization and the Internet allowed instantaneous perfect
replication. IPRs therefore had to grow. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT
(2001). In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court expanded the Copyright Act to cover a form of
liability it had never before recognized in the context of copyright—providing technology
that induces copyright infringement. MGM Studios v. Grokster, Ltd, 545 U.S. 913, 940
n.13 (2005) (ruling against Grokster’s peer-to-peer file sharing program).
3
See DON TAPSCOTT & ANTHONY D. WILLIAMS, WIKINOMICS: HOW MASS
COLLABORATION CHANGES EVERYTHING 179 (Portfolio 2006). In the case of software,
product life-cycles have historically been somewhere between 5 and 15 years. Still,
copyright protection of computer programs follows today the same terms as those of any
artistic work and is currently multiple times over product lifetimes. YALE M. BRAUNSTEIN
ET AL., Economics of Property Rights as Applied to Computer Software and Data Bases,
in TECHNOLOGY AND COPYRIGHT 231, 241–42 & n.11 (George P. Bush et al. eds., 1979)
(questioning whether efficiency gains would outweigh administrative costs of multiple
protection terms in copyright legislation). Recently, leading U.S. economists published a
well-argued note in a legal case challenging the copyright term extension in the United
States from 50 to 70 years. See, e.g., Brief for George A. Akerlof et al. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 372 (2003), available at
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/amici/economists.pdf.
4
The Directorate-General for Competition recognizes that “[t]he impact of intellectual
property rights on expansion and entry depends on the nature and actual strength of the
intellectual property right held by the allegedly dominant undertaking.” DG Competition
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Anticompetitive abuses involving refusals to supply licenses
may occur when the dominant undertaking denies an actual or
potential licensee access to an input to exclude it from participating
in an economic activity.6 IPRs are legal barriers and may limit the
number of market participants. Foreclosure may be of concern to
competition law when efficient rivals are discouraged from entry
or encouraged to exit.7 The ability for IP owners to do so stems
from their market power, typically characterized by sustained high
levels of market shares,8 as well as barriers to entry and expansion
faced by competitors. Antitrust authorities look at whether the
latter would have been sufficiently immediate and persistent to
prevent the abuse of market power.9 This area is highly
contentious because in some cases, antitrust/competition policy
requires dominant undertakings to grant competitors access to
valuable IPRs in order to ensure that effective competition is
maintained.10 This raises the question of whether and how

Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses,
at 13 (2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/art82/
discpaper2005.pdf [hereinafter DG Competition Paper].
5
Refusals to license generally occur where a company that has exclusive control over
a scarce resource owns access that is indispensable to compete in the same market or
closely related market. The undertaking takes advantage of such a strategic position and
employs it in order to preserve or strengthen its dominant position in that market or to
acquire it in the second-related market.
6
Refusals to supply can take several forms. It can be a simple refusal (halting existing
supplies or refusing to deal) or a constructive refusal (pricing so that it becomes
economically unviable for the buyer to continue its activities, calculated delays in
supplying, exclusive dealing or tying arrangements). It can also be horizontal (where the
dominant undertaking attempts to exclude a rival at its own level in the supply chain) or
vertical (where the dominant undertaking attempts to exclude a active or potential
participant in a downstream market).
7
That is not to say that any time an efficient rival is discouraged from entry or
encouraged to exist there is a foreclosure and/or an abuse because of IPR. However, it is
a weighty factor affecting the conclusion of the analysis.
8
See Commission Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market, 1997 O.J. (C 372)
paras. 54–55.
9
E.U. authorities recognize that this assessment depends on the characteristics and
dynamics of the market—factors such as capacity constraints, the history of frequent and
successful entry and entry costs. DG Competition Paper, supra note 4, at 13–14.
10
An additional explanation for this conflict stems from competition law’s focus on
attaining competitive market conditions not particular outcomes, as opposed to
intellectual property law’s preoccupation with ensuring the optimum amount of
innovation. Competition law assumes that deterring monopolies will lead to the
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antitrust/competition law can be used to counterbalance
informational bottlenecks that could become a form of abuse.11
There is a need for clear and economically robust rules to regulate
the amorphous boundaries of innovation.
United States jurisprudence has a long history of examining
such issues in sectors involving IPRs as well as more traditional
infrastructure.12 It has settled on a deferential approach. In the
absence of immediate consumer harm, antitrust law is reluctant to

attainment of economic efficiency, while intellectual property law assumes that
efficiency will be achieved only if regulators correctly estimate the proper mix of
incentive and access to copyright as needed to provide the optimal amount of innovation.
See David McGowan, Regulating Competition in the Information Age: Computer
Software as an Essential Facility Under the Sherman Act, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 771, 773–74 (1996); Thomas F. Cotter, Intellectual Property and the Essential
Facilities Doctrine, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 211, 227–28 (1999).
11
See, e.g., Frank L Fine, European Community Compulsory Licensing Policy: Heresy
versus Common Sense, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 619, 620 (2004) (describing “a stormy
debate on both sides of the Atlantic as to whether compulsory licensing, on antitrust
grounds, is an appropriate means of breaking monopolies that owe their existence, to a
large extent, to the ownership of valuable intellectual property”); see also Alberto
Heimler & Antonio Nicita, Intellectual Property Right-Based Monopolies and Ex-Post
Competition: Some Reflections on the Essential Facilities Doctrine, at 26–28 (2000)
(noting the growing number of cases involving IPRs and competition law).
12
Section 2 of the Sherman Act punishes, with a fine or by imprisonment or both,
“monopolization” and “attempts to monopolize.” Monopolization occurs when the
owner wilfully acquires monopoly power in the relevant market or maintains the power
without any superior product, business acumen, or historic accident. See Intergraph Corp.
v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999). American antitrust treatment of
monopolization cases in general tends to focus its attention exclusively on the market
where the conduct under analysis displays its effects. This means that the monopolization
claim under § 2 will be framed (as monopolization or attempt to monopolize) pursuant to
the degree of market power held by the company in the market that will be ultimately
affected by the anticompetitive conduct. Attempt to monopolize regards conduct that
aims at achieving monopoly power in a certain market. These are harder to prove
because every firm tends to achieve a position of strength in the market. Thus liability is
found when there is proof of: 1) predatory or anticompetitive conduct, 2) a specific intent
to monopolize, and 3) a dangerous probability of success. Spectrum Sports Inc. v. Shirley
McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1993); see, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law
Offices of Cutris V. Trinko, L.P., 540 U.S. 398 (2004); United States v. Terminal R.R.
Ass’n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. CSU, LLC. v.
Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support
Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994); BellSouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelley Info.
Publ’g, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
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compel access where an owner unilaterally refuses to license.13
Proof of such approach is evident in Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v.
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP. (“Trinko”), where the
Supreme Court held that a company with monopoly power had no
duty to open an infrastructural facility to its competitors because
compelling it to share the source of its own advantage lessens the
incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those
economically beneficial facilities.14 This suggests that U.S.
jurisprudence accepts the philosophy that markets are best placed
to determine an efficient equilibrium.
On May 1, 2002, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and
U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) conducted a round of hearings
on single firm conduct with respect to refusals to deal.15 The
discussion focused on views on the nature of IPRs compared to
property rights, as well as on the conditions to rebut a
presumptively valid justification for an owner to refuse access to
its IPRs. This was followed by another round of hearings on July
18, 2006.16 This discussion focused on proposed tests, as well as
13

The locus classicus of this is Data Gen. Corp., 36 F.3d at 1186–87, where the court
held: 1) neither the antitrust nor IP legislation worked to erode the scope of other, 2) the
limited copyright monopoly was based on Congress’ intent that the right to “exclude
others from using their works creates a system of incentives that promotes consumer
welfare in the long term by encouraging investment in the creation of desirable artistic
and functional works of expression,” and 3) IPRs, although granted by the State, were not
exempt from the application of antitrust law. See Emanuela Arezzo, Intellectual Property
Rights at the Crossroad Between Monopolization and Abuse of Dominant Position:
American and European Perspectives Compared, 24 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO.
L. 455, 505 (2006) (noting that “the United States intends to protect competition by
preserving a dominant firm’s incentives to compete and innovate; in order to do so, U.S.
antitrust authorities think it is necessary not to force a dominant firm to deal or to license
its competitors because they fear this might reduce its incentives to invest and compete to
gain a monopolistic position”).
14
540 U.S. 398 (2004) [hereinafter Trinko].
15
Participants in this session discussed “the extent to which refusals to license
intellectual property create competitive concerns, how recent case law on refusals to
license is being interpreted, and whether this recent case law appropriately balances the
interests of intellectual property law and antitrust law.” A list of the participants, as well
as a transcript of the proceedings can be found at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/
intellect/detailsandparticipants.htm#May%201 (last visited Oct. 12, 2007).
16
Federal Trade Commission/Department of Justice Hearings, Federal Trade
Commision, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/07/section2july.htm (last visited Oct. 12,
2007).
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on the competence of courts to determine harm to markets and
consumers and to regulate the terms of access. There was also
recognition that economic analysis has not developed sufficiently
to provide clear rules.17
The E.U. has chosen a different approach to regulating
innovation. Influenced by the German ordoliberal school, it sees
competition law as an instrument to ensure freedom of action and
participation from all market players.18 It has developed tests to
determine when an IPR owner exceeds the basis of IPRs granted to
it. An IP owner had the duty to license its IPRs where refusing
access to indispensable proprietary content would stifle a new
product from being offered in a related market for which there was
real consumer demand.19 As economic theory was introduced into
European competition analysis, its tests became more ambitious.
Most recently in Commission of the European Communities v.
Microsoft, the Commission was purportedly able to weigh the loss
in incentives to the owner to innovate by providing access against
an aggregate gain in incentives to innovation in the relevant

17

Jeffrey K. Mackie-Mason, What to Do About Unilateral Refusals to License, Federal
Trade Commision, http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020501mackie2.pdf (“The optimal
balance between innovation incentives and protection against static monopoly harm is not
knowable to any reasonable degree of precision. Economists may be able to identify
some special cases in which the desired rule is unambiguously knowable, but these cases
will be few.”).
18
The core principles and ideas of the ordoliberal school can be found in: DAVID
GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE 241–46 (Oxford
University Press, 2001) (1998). In essence, ordoliberal theory focuses on the importance
of a stable and transparent framework of rules for the efficient functioning of a private
market economy, as embodied by the notion of “complete competition” in which no firm
can engage in abuses of monopoly positions and other forms of coercion in a given
market, emphasizing the need for the state to ensure that the free market produces results
close to its theoretical potential. Article 82 of the E.C. Treaty governing this area of
European competition law provides a list of examples of abusive conduct, but E.C.
founders purposefully left both the concepts of dominance and of abuse to be further
developed by the Court of Justice and Member State courts. See Treaty Establishing the
European Community, art. 86, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3. [hereinafter E.C. Treaty]
This was similar to the Warren Court’s antitrust populist approach which focused on
freedom of action but with concern focused on autonomy for small players in market.
19
Case C-241/91, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Comm’n, 1995 E.C.R. I-743 at para. 2.
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markets identified.20 At the time of this writing, the Court of First
Instance has not pronounced on the substantive merits of the case.
In December 2005, the European Commission initiated a
public consultation to review the application of Article 82 of the
E.C. Treaty to exclusionary abuses and treatment of refusals to
license, followed by a public hearing on June 14, 2006.21 It
adopted an effects-based analysis grounded on economic principles
rather than per se prohibitions, which was roundly welcomed.22
However, respondents were also concerned that an effects-based
analysis would be hard to implement.23 There were numerous
requests for clearer rules to assist businesses in self-assessments of
lawful conduct,24 including “white areas.”25 DG Competition has
indicated that IPRs and their effects will be carefully evaluated.26

20
Case C-3/37.792, Comm’n v. Microsoft, 2004 E.C.R. at para. 782. Intriguingly, an
observation has been made that “[t]he possibilities of even the US and EU to influence
the behavior of the world’s biggest computer and software companies are limited.”
MIKKO VÄLIMÄKI, THE RISE OF OPEN SOURCE LICENSING: A CHALLENGE TO THE USE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY, 79 n.207 (Helsinki, ed., Turre
Publishing 2005).
21
Exclusionary abuses refer to “behaviours by dominant firms which are likely to have
a foreclosure effect on the market . . . to actual or potential competitors and which
ultimately harm consumers.” DG Competition Paper, supra note 4, at 4.
22
See, e.g,, Baker & McKenzie Response to DG Competition’s Article 82
Consultation, 1 (Mar. 31, 2006), http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/
art82/076.pdf (stating that “we welcome the proposal by DG Competition to adopt an
effects based approach grounded on foreclosure analysis. While we comment on how the
Paper should be clarified and expanded, we agree with the broad thrust of the Paper in
applying economic principles to Article 82”).
23
See, e.g., Common Position of Cercle de l’Industrie on Revision of the Application of
Articles 82 EC Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses, para. 9 (Mar. 31, 2006) [hereinafter
Common Position of Cercle], http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/
art82/008_en.pdf.
24
This is supported by DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC
HISTORY 162–66 (W.W. Norton & Co., 1981).
25
See Common Position of Cercle, supra note 23, at para. 28.
26
According to the DG Competition, it is “sufficient” that competitors are
“disadvantaged and consequently compete less aggressively . . .” while E.U.
“enforcement policy toward refusals to supply will take into account both the effect of
having more short-run competition and the possible long-run effects on investment
incentives” though less weight will be given to future efficiencies compared to present
efficiencies. DG Competition Paper, supra at note 4, paras. 58, 213. See also Arezzo,
supra note 13, at 457 (asserting that “European antitrust law has endorsed a more
restrictive attitude, holding that when exceptional circumstances do exist, the exclusive
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However, as in the U.S., a concern has also been expressed that
economic theory in this area had not developed to an extent where
the impact of such refusals can be sufficiently understood for
regulators to intervene with confidence.27
These actions of the Commission and the responses thereto are
important and have contributed to an understanding of the
Interface. Nevertheless, beyond a rough measure, there are still
difficulties in deciding when and whether it is right for mandatory
access to be granted to IPRs. Moreover, the approaches to solving
this puzzle are likely to be heavily influenced by socio-economic
infrastructures including fairly entrenched views about the role of
capitalism and socialism.28 Solutions will not come easily and,
even if forthcoming, might not be consistent in different
jurisdictions.
It will continue to be important to try to work out the test for
dominance and with it, the role of IPRs in the antitrust and
competition law context. But, it is possible also that non-legal and
non-traditional economic development will make it more likely
that economic dominance will be less likely to occur in market
situations. This means that it is possible that collective social and
economic activities without traditional economic incentives will
make it more likely that competitiveness and consumer welfare
will thrive in markets driven by IP products and services.
Up to now the market, and together with it the propertisation of
information, have become integral mechanisms to efficiently
allocate scarce resources. Economic rewards have been considered

faculty of the IP-owner can be curtailed in favor of a more competitive structure of the
market”).
27
See Public Hearing on Article 82 Before the European Comm’n (14 June 2006)
(testimony of Damien Geradin, Global Competition Law Centre), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/art82/en_42.wmv.
28
For example, the DOJ and FTC have adopted a decidedly more capitalistic approach,
preferring not to disincentivize IP owners with vague and complicated rules. In doing so,
there is a risk that the state of innovation may reflect the reality of geopolitics that too
much information will be controlled by the hands of a select few. DG Competition has
been influenced by a more socialist perspective of IP ownership, and a general distrust
for broad IPRs. Thus dominant IP owners are under a “special responsibility” not to
distort the competitive structure, weakened by their presence, further by abusing their
dominance. Commission Decision 98/531/EC, 1998 O.J. (246), para. 267.
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necessary to promote the creation of artistic or inventive works.
But there is evidence that the needs for those economic rewards are
changing. We know that some creativity such as cave drawings
has been historically without the need for personal economic
incentives. But dissemination of creative works almost always
required incentives and operate through a downward dissemination
of information goods. For some time, there has been evidence that
at least some types of creativity and dissemination do not fit into
this traditional mould. Open source is perhaps the most wellknown example.
The law has often lagged behind technology and economic
changes. The law of the Interface is no exception. Thus, while
competition authorities in the U.S. and E.U.—both global leaders
in IP and competition policy—apply themselves assiduously to the
task of ironing out the analytics of abuses of dominant positions
including the refusals to license,29 the world had moved quietly
and quickly forward.
In 2006, Time Magazine selected “You” to be Person of the
Year.30 It did so because it saw “collaboration on a scale never
seen before . . . wresting power from the few and helping one
another for nothing and how that will not only change the world,
but also change the way the world changes.”31 Traditionally, the
sunk costs of innovation and commoditization were generally high
in nearly every commercially valuable IP market.32 IP markets are
traditionally organized along national boundaries according to
strict hierarchical lines of supply, and customers and consumers
are confined to relatively limited economic roles—whether as
passive consumers or corporate customers trapped beneath IP

29

See supra notes 5–10 and accompanying text.
Lev Grossman, Time’s Person of the Year: You, TIME, Dec. 13, 2006, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1569514,00.html.
31
Id.
32
DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION
531 (Pearson 2005) (1990) (citing examples of investment outlays by major
multinationals as a percentage of revenue: “In 2002, Microsoft (software) (invested)
15.2%; Advanced Micro Devices, 30.3% (microprocessor chips); Biogen
(biotechnology), 32%”).
30
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owners in organizational hierarchies.33 Owners with substantial
market power could exclude competitors by unilaterally refusing to
license their proprietary content in primary or secondary markets.34
Barriers to entry were high, and the risk of consumer harm could
be great. Antitrust analysis took place in these paradigmatic,
vertical silos of innovation.
While these vertical hierarchies remain, changes in technology
are giving rise to new models of production based on collaboration
and self-organization rather than on hierarchy and control.35
Technology has “increase[d] access to information, and [brought]
us closer to” an ideally “efficient, frictionless global market.”36
Ordinary individuals have platforms to collaborate and share
content at very little cost.37 Critically, it potentially reduces the
reliance on dominant firms and markets to respectively create and
trade the goods and services they desire, and with them the
anticompetitive market effects of a refusal to license.38
This new mode of innovation and value creation is called “peer
production” or “wikinomics.”39 Peer production has reached a
33

IP exploitation is essentially based on two rights which have been codified in
national legislation through the impetus of international treaties. The first is the right to
own and sell ideas. The second is the right to control the use of those ideas after sale.
These create vertical relationships which content protected by IP is traded on the
marketplace for payment, whether in the form of a royalty or a license fee. As an
example, see Accenture Global Convergence Forum 2005: Plenary Session, available at
http://www.accenture.com/Global/About_Accenture/Business_Events/By_Industry/Com
munications/DigitalMeet.htm (noting that “in the current value chain in the digital world
we look for content creation to come from the media and entertainment industry,
distribution from the communications and retail world, while end users are dependent on
consumer electronics for delivery”). See also RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 734
(Oxford Univeristy Press 2005) (1989) (“Generally speaking, intellectual property rights
are the product of, and are protected by, national systems of law, although the growth of
international commerce has resulted in an increasing measure of national cooperation.”).
34
See DG Competition Paper, supra note 4, at 67–69.
35
See generally TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 3.
36
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 237 (Farrar, Staus & Giroux 2006) (2005).
37
TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 12.
38
FRIEDMAN, supra note 36, at 93–95.
39
The term “peer production” describes what happens when masses of people and
firms collaborate openly to drive innovation and growth, and was coined by Professor
Yochai Benkler in his 2003 paper, Coase’s Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm.
See Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE
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tipping point where new forms of mass collaboration are changing
the production and exploitation of IP. Economies of scale and
scope—which gave dominant undertakings a highly developed
distribution network and wide geographical coverage—are
vanishing.40 In other words, capacity constraints due to the
prohibitive cost of sunk investments are becoming less important.
The power to disseminate products and ideas rather than just
passively consuming them fundamentally reshapes the flow of
innovation.41 Critically, it potentially reduces the reliance on
dominant firms and markets to respectively create and trade the
goods and services they desire, and with them, the anticompetitive
market effects of a refusal to license.42 It follows that if there is an
alternative system of innovation that creates more market players
on a continuing basis, it should result in less dominance and,
consequently, less need for intervention by competition authorities
in IP markets.
II. WIKINOMICS: ANOTHER WAY FORWARD?
Peer production is emerging as an alternative model of
innovation that harnesses human ingenuity efficiently and
effectively. Two examples are open source43 and crowd-sourcing.44

L.J. 369, 375 (2002). The term “wikinomics” was coined by Don Tapscott and Anthony
D. Williams. See generally TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 3.
40
TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 10–11.
41
Michael Sandel observed that this phenomenon was first identified by Karl Max and
Friedrich Engels in the Communist Manifesto, published in 1848. While the shrinking
and flattening of the world constitute a difference of degree from what they saw
happening then, it is nevertheless part of the same historical trend they observed—the
inexorable march of technology and capital to remove all barriers. See FRIEDMAN, supra
note 36, at 234.
42
As Thomas Friedman put it, “communities of geeks are now collaborating to design
new software and then to upload it to the world. . . . The genesis of the flat world
platform not only enabled more people to author more content, and to collaborate on that
content. It also enabled them to upload files and globalize that content . . . without going
through any of the traditional hierarchical organisations or institutions.” FRIEDMAN, supra
note 36, at 93–94.
43
Wikipedia describes “open source” as “a set of principles and practices that promote
open access to the design and production of goods and knowledge. The term is most
commonly applied to the source code of software that is made available to the general
public with relaxed or non-existent intellectual property restrictions. This allows users to
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The collective knowledge, capability, and resources embodied
within broad horizontal networks of participants can be mobilized
to accomplish more than one firm acting alone. More importantly,
the ability to integrate the talents of dispersed individuals and
organizations could potentially mitigate the anticompetitive effects
of refusals to license by dominant undertakings.45 Indeed, it may
reshape the strategies through which dominant undertakings
exploit their IPRs, so that instead of refusing access, they actively
seek out other stakeholders to in a new model of collaborative
proprietary innovation. It is important to clarify, however, that
peer production does not merely encompass altruistic community
efforts like those from the contributors of Wikipedia or some open
source software projects. As will be seen, peer production also
offers a platform for commercially viable, sometimes highly
successful, business models.46
At least two factors made this possible. First, in the 1990s,
Windows-enabled computers made it possible for individuals to
author their own content from their desktops in digital form.47
With the steady advance of telecommunication, they were able to
create software content through either incremental individual effort or through
collaboration.” Open source, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_source (last
visited Oct. 7, 2007).
44
Wikipedia describes “crowd sourcing” as “a neologism for the act of taking a job
traditionally performed by an employee or contractor, and outsources it to an undefined,
generally large group of people in the form of an open call. . . . In some cases the labor
is well-compensated. In other cases the only rewards may be kudos or intellectual
satisfaction. Crowdsourcing may produce solutions from amateurs or volunteers working
in their spare time.” Crowdsourcing,Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Crowd_sourcing (last visited Oct. 7, 2007).
45
As Thomas Friedman put it, “Everywhere you turn, hierarchies are being challenged
from below or are transforming themselves from top-down structures into more
horizontal and collaborative ones. ‘Globalization’ . . . is not simply about how
governments, business, and people communicate, not just about how organizations
interact, but is about the emergence of completely new social, political, and business
models. . . . [T]here is something about the flattening of the world that is going to be
qualitatively different from the great changes of previous eras: the speed and breadth with
which it is taking hold. The introduction of printing happened over a period of decades
and for a long time only affected only a relatively small part of the planet. . . . This
flattening process is happening at warp speed and directly or indirectly touching a lot
more people on the planet at once.” FRIEDMAN, supra note 36, at 48–49.
46
See, for example, infra Parts II.A.2 and II.B.2.
47
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 36, at 54–55.
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disseminate their own digital content in new ways to many more
people. At the same time, computers became cheaper and more
available all around the world. There was also an explosion of
software that allowed work to be dissected, sent for remote
development, and reassembled.48 People discovered that they
could connect their computers to their telephones and emails
through the Internet. The diffusion of computer, faxes, Windows,
and modems connected to a global telephone network came
together in the 1990s to create a basic platform that started the
global information revolution.49
Second, the dotcom bubble that stimulated the overinvestment
in fibre-optic cable communications allowed competitors and
consumers to use networks to link to Internet services.50 Glass and
radio waves are woven into intercontinental fibre-optic nerves that
wire up disparate individual undertakings into a grand network.51
Unlike the first generation of companies, companies today can
plug-and-play because a lot of the essential infrastructure is free.52
48

See id.
See id. at 53. From a geopolitical perspective, the opening up of China, India, and
Eastern Europe coincided with the growth of the global communications platform. There
was nothing to stop the digital representation of everything—words, music, photos, data,
and video—and the global exchange of all that digital information. This coincidental
breakthrough suddenly gave individuals both reach and scale—reach because they could
create content in so many new and different ways, and scale because they could share
their content with so many more people. See id. at 51–52.
50
The dot com bubble happened shortly after Netscape went public in 1995 and made
the Internet accessible to everyone. The more alive the Internet was, the more different
people demanded computers, software, and telecommunications networks that could
easily digitize words, music, data, and photos and transport them through the Internet to
anyone else’s computer. In that year, another catalytic event took place. Windows ‘95
was rolled out with a built-in browser that allowed all PC applications to interact with the
Internet. This set off an explosion in demand for all things digital and sparked the
Internet boom, because everything was going to be digitized and transported and sold on
the Internet. Then the demand for Internet-based products and services would be infinite.
As investors watched this mad rush to digitize, they realized that the demand for web
service companies and fiber-optic cables to handle all the digital stuff was going to be
limitless. It sparked an overinvestment in fiber-optic cables which dramatically drove
down the cost of making a phone call or transmitting data anywhere in the world. And
thus was the dot com bubble born. See id. at 57–66.
51
See id. at 66–69.
52
See id. at 181. The ready availability of well-honed and free Linux software, the
Apache Web server, the MySQL database, and the PHP and Perl scripting languages—
collectively known as the LAMP stack—means significantly lower capital investments.
49
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The Internet significantly lowered entry barriers. From this came a
collaborative interface for wikinomics—a global, Web-enabled
platform for multiple forms of collaboration.
A. Schumpeter, Creative Destruction, and Wikinomics
Underlying the trade-off between free competition and
exclusive IPRs is Joseph Schumpeter’s theory that it may
sometimes be necessary to forego static efficiency for greater gains
in dynamic efficiency.53 Schumpeter described the process of
“creative destruction” and the dynamics of innovation as the most
important drivers of the competitive process.54 Technical progress
makes market power a temporary phenomenon, more than
compensating for static welfare losses.55 Further, without proper
regard for incentives, the result of competition will be insufficient
innovation. It follows that since innovation is the engine that
See LAMP (software bundle), Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LAMP_
(software_bundle) (last visited Oct. 7, 2007); see also Plug-and-play, Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plug-and-play (last visited Oct. 7, 2007).
53
Static efficiency occurs when firms compete within an existing technology to
streamline their methods, cut costs, and drive the price of a product embodying that
technology down to something close to the cost of unit production. Static goals lead to a
focus on short-run marginal cost, to the exclusion of long run efficient capital
investments in research and development (“R&D”). Static efficiency is a powerful force
for increasing consumer welfare, but economists tell us that an even greater driver of
consumer welfare is dynamic efficiency. Dynamic efficiency refers to gains that result
from entirely new ways of doing business. See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (Harper & Brothers Publishers, 2d ed. 1947).
54
See id. at 82–85. Creative destruction is describes the process of transformation that
accompanies radical innovation. In Schumpeter’s vision of capitalism, innovative entry
by entrepreneurs was the force that sustained long-term economic growth, even as it
destroyed the value of established companies that enjoyed some degree of monopoly
power. “Economists are at long last emerging from the stage at which price competition
was all they saw. As soon as quality competition and sales effort are admitted into the
sacred precincts of theory, the price variable is ousted from its dominant position.
However, it is still competition within a rigid pattern of invariant conditions, methods of
production and forms of industrial organisation in particular, that practically monopolizes
attention. But in capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not that
kind of competition which counts but competition from the new commodity, the new
technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organisation . . . —competition
which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the
margins of the profit and outputs of existing firms but at their foundations and their very
lives.” Id. at 84.
55
See id. at 97 n.13.
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powers competition and ensures consumer welfare, the goal of
competition law should be to encourage broad IP protection to
foster and support firms’ incentives to innovate.56
While
Wikinomics might call into question to some extent Schumpeter’s
view on the need for incentives for innovation, it might prove him
right on the role of creative destruction. In any case, Wikinomics
has the potential to supercharge the process of “creative
destruction” in at least some IP markets. The most important
question is whether Wikinomics will lead to a transformation of
the competition-law landscape. Below the question is asked in the
context of some landmark cases and new factual scenarios.
1. Microsoft
In the E.U. Microsoft case, the Commission found that
Microsoft was a “superdominant” undertaking which used its
market power to exclude competition and destroy the incentive for
competitors to innovate.57 It found that in the past, Microsoft
competitors were deterred from introducing new application
programs for the Microsoft workgroup server operating systems.58
This is because if they now did not have interface protocols for
Windows, their only market was Microsoft who might buy it and
introduce it into the system.59 Moreover, the Commission did not
disclose its interface information to competitors who could or had
56
Phillip Beutel, The Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property Economics: A
Schumpeterian View, in ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST: NEW ISSUES, QUESTIONS, AND
INSIGHTS, 133, 133 (Lawrence Wu ed., 2004).
57
Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Comm’n of the European Comtys. v. Microsoft Corp.,
2004 O.J. (L 32) para. 435 (“Microsoft, with its market shares of over 90%, occupies
almost the whole market—it therefore approaches a position of complete monopoly, and
can be said to hold an overwhelming dominant position.”). It should be recognized from
the onset that the Commission took great care in preparing its case against Microsoft,
even subjecting the file to peer-review. VALENTINE KORAH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND THE EC COMPETITION RULES 166 (Hart Publishing 2006).
58
Workgroup server operating systems be understood as software that manages the
sharing of the resources of several computers within a linked network. The operating
system processes raw system data and user input, and responds by allocating and
managing tasks and internal system resources as a service to users and programs of the
system. See generally, WILLIAM STALLINGS, OPERATING SYSTEMS, INTERNALS AND
DESIGN PRINCIPLES (Prentice Hill, 2005).
59
See Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Comm’n v. Microsoft, 2004 O.J. (L 32) paras. 453,
779.
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designed competing programs.
Microsoft’s server market.60

[Vol. 18

This locked consumers into

In an interim hearing, the Court of First Instance denied
Microsoft’s request for a stay of the Commission’s fine of nearly
€500 million, the largest ever imposed on a single firm.61
However, what was perhaps more important to Microsoft is that
the CFI also denied its request for a stay of the Commission’s
order for Microsoft to disclose interface information on reasonable
and non-discriminatory terms.62 Specifically, the Commission
ordered Microsoft to disclose to competitors the interface
specifications of the Windows workgroup server operating systems
so as to enable them to achieve full interoperability with
Microsoft’s desktop Windows operating systems.63
The
Commission in Microsoft opined that since access to the source
code was not being required, Microsoft’s fears of cloning were not
justified.64 It followed that Microsoft’s incentives to innovate
would not be affected.65 This order covers past, present, and future
Microsoft products without any time limitation.66 This means that
Microsoft must continually update this information as it brings to
market new versions of its products. This remedy has been
criticized as extraordinary, both in terms of the significant loss in
the strategic value of its copyright and trade secrets as but also the
fact that competition authorities are involved in the first

60

See id. at para. 694. It should be recognized from the onset that the Commission
took great care in preparing its case against Microsoft, even subjecting the file to peerreview. See KORAH, supra note 57, at166.
61
KORAH, supra note 57, at 150; see also Microsoft hit by record EU fine, CNN.com,
available at http://edition.cnn.com/2004/BUSINESS/03/24/microsoft.eu/ (Mar. 25,
2004).
62
KORAH, supra note 57, at 162.
63
Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Comm’n v. Microsoft, 2004 O.J. (L 32) para. 999.
64
Id. at paras. 713–22.
65
Id. at para. 729. But see KORAH, supra note 57, at 162 (saying that: “the incentive
must have been considerably reduced”). And if Microsoft’s cutback on R&D is anything
to go by, Korah is probably right. Microsoft’s Annual Reports for 2000 and 2005,
available at http://www.microsoft.com/msft/ar.mspx (last visited Oct. 8, 2007) (showing
that Microsoft reduced R&D expenditures from $3.775 million in 2000 to $1.241 million
in 2005).
66
Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Comm’n v. Microsoft, 2004 O.J. (L 32) paras. 1000–03.
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place in determining how much a company should disclose.67 This
contrasts with the result in the U.S. DOJ antitrust action against
Microsoft, where the DOJ made similar claims against but were
only able to achieve more modest results.68 Microsoft’s conduct
reduced the incentives of competitors and potential competitors to
undertake R&D because “they know that Microsoft will be able to
limit the rewards from any resulting innovation . . . .”69
However, the theory that market power can be leveraged to
significantly stifle innovation may now be questionable as an
absolute rule. Since the elimination of Netscape,70 Microsoft did
not experience any real competition in the Web browser market.
67

See Ian S. Forrester, Article 82: Remedies in Search of Theories?, 28 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 919, 927, 931 (2005) (drawing a parallel with Syfait v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE,
Case C-53/03, 2005 ECR I-4609 where “GSK, a pharmaceutical company, [was] under
an affirmative duty to supply unlimited orders from wholesalers active in the trade of
certain prescription drugs from low-price to high-priced Member States,” but
distinguishing Microsoft because it goes further and represents the most expansive inroad
of E.C. competition law enforcement into the protection of IPRs in Community legal
history).
68
Essentially, the U.S. case revolved around the allegation that Microsoft had illegally
tied its operating system to its Internet browser, thereby extending its monopoly power in
both markets. The DC Circuit Court of Appeals found that Microsoft prevented
computer manufacturers from modifying or removing pre-bundled icons. See United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 202 (D.D.C. 2002). In addition, the court
found that Microsoft entered into agreements with Internet Access Providers and
Independent Software Vendors to promote its browser exclusively, and also to use its
Java Virtual Machine instead of Sun Microsystems’ Java programming. Id. The trial
ended in settlement, with Microsoft agreeing not to prohibit computer manufacturers and
vendors from adding features that could divert users away from Microsoft products. Final
Judgment, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f200400/200457.htm. The agreement also prohibits
Microsoft from entering into exclusionary agreements with Internet Access Providers
prohibiting the use of products that compete with Microsoft’s products. Id. Microsoft
also cannot discriminate against internet access providers, independent software vendors,
and internet content providers who choose to use competing products. Id. Finally, the
agreement also stipulated that Microsoft disclose to Independent Software Vendors how
its operating system interoperated with its middleware products. Id. This allows
competitors to use Windows for their own programs. Id. In contrast, the E.U.
investigations were more narrowly tailored to issues of server compatibility and the
bundling of its media player software with its Windows operating system. See generally
Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Comm’n v. Microsoft, 2004 O.J. (L 32).
69
Complaint at 12, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. 1998),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f1700/1763.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2007).
70
Mozilla, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mozilla (last visited Oct. 5, 2007).
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In 2004, Netscape was reborn as Firefox, an open-source Web
browser.71 Firefox allows users to alter the code and create plugins and customized “extensions” that can then be downloaded by
any user.72 Web-surfers adopted Firefox rapidly, despite Internet
Explorer coming pre-installed with every copy of Microsoft’s
dominant Windows operating system. And Firefox is a viable
alternative to Windows Internet Explorer.73 Downloads have
continued at an increasing rate; as of February 2007, Firefox had
been downloaded over 300 million times.74 Internet Explorer has
71

“The Firefox project went through many versions before 1.0 was released on
November 9, 2004. In addition to stability and security fixes, the Mozilla Foundation
released its first major update to Firefox 1.5 on November 29, 2005. On October 24,
2006, Mozilla released Firefox 2. This version includes updates to the tabbed browsing
environment, the extensions manager, the GUI, and the find, search and software update
engines; a new session restore feature; inline spell checking; and an anti-phishing feature
which was implemented by Google as an extension and later merged into the program
itself.” See Mozilla Firefox, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firefox (last visited
Oct. 5, 2007).
72
For example the Bugmenot feature allows users to bypass compulsory registration
for sites such as the New York Times. It automatically enters account details from its
database, so that users do not have to go through the entire registration process.
Bugmenot.com, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.bugmenot.com/faq.php (last
visited Oct. 9, 2007).
73
In same year Firefox was introduced, Forbes called Firefox “the best Web browser.”
Arik Hesseldahl, Better Browser Now The Best, FORBES, Sept. 29, 2004, available at
http://www.forbes.com/2004/09/29/cx_ah_0929 tentech.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2007).
PC World named Firefox the “Product of the Year” in 2005 on their “100 Best Products
of
2005”
list.
PCWorld.com,
The
100
Best
Products
of
2005,
http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,120763-page,12/article.html (last visited Oct. 2,
2007). After the release of Firefox 2 and Internet Explorer 7 in 2006, PC World reviewed
both and announced that Firefox was the better browser. Erik Larkin, Radically New IE 7
or Updated Mozilla Firefox 2—Which Browser Is Better? PC WORLD, Oct. 24, 2006,
available at http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,127309-pg,1-RSS,RSS/article.html (last
visited Oct. 9, 2007). A report in mid-2006 by OneStat stated that almost 13% of Internet
users around the world now use Firefox, up from 8% in 2005. Melissa Tan, How to
switch to Mozilla Firefox, STRAITS TIMES INTERACTIVE, Apr. 3, 2007, available at
http://www.straitstimes.com.
74
Mozilla Firefox, supra note 71. This number does not include downloads using
software updates or from third-party websites. They also do not represent a user count,
as one download may be installed on many machines, or one person may download the
software multiple times. Mozilla Vice President of Products Christopher Beard estimates
that Firefox had 70 million to 80 million users as of October 2006. Elizabeth Montalbano,
Final Version of Mozilla Firefox 2 Available Today, PC WORLD, Oct. 24, 2006, available
at http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,127603-c,mozilla/article.html (last visited Oct. 5,
2007).
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seen a steady decline of its usage share since Firefox’s release.75
With Microsoft releasing version 7 of Internet Explorer (“IE7”)
that same month, Firefox’s share growth might have been expected
to slow, but IE7 has instead gained share mostly at the expense of
older versions of IE.76
What is perhaps more remarkable about Firefox is that two
people in particular are most responsible for the browser’s success:
a 19-year-old Stanford sophomore and 24-year old New Zealander
working in an open-source community for free, starting from both
ends of the world and without having ever met, produced a
browser that took 15% of the browser market in about three
years.77 This raises the question whether any analysis of
Microsoft’s market power as a vertical silo of innovation would be
accurate today without taking into consideration peer produced
alternatives such as Firefox.
2. Trinko
In Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v.
Trinko, LLP., Verizon was the incumbent local exchange carrier
(“ILEC”) in New York.78 The 1996 Telecommunications Act
requires that ILECs sell unbundled parts of their local networks at
cost to competitive local exchange carriers (“CLECs”), so that
ILECs share their networks to give new competitors a toehold in

75

According to Dutch web analytics firm OneStat, by July 2006, Firefox was the
second most widely-used browser, with 12.93% of global usage share, a percentage that
has remained steady. OneStat.com, Mozilla Firefox Global Usage Share Remains Stable,
http://www.onestat.com/html/aboutus_pressbox44-mozilla-firefox-has-slightlyincreased.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2007). By December 2006, according to data made
available by U.S. firm NetApplications, Firefox’s market share had grown to 14%
globally. Gregg Keizer, Firefox Continues Growth, PC Chat, Jan. 17, 2007,
http://www.pcchatshow.com /articles/showarticle.php?ArticleID=642.
76
Gregg Keizer, Despite 100 Million IE 7 Installs, Microsoft’s Browser Still Loses
Jan.
16,
2007,
available
at
Ground,
INFORMATIONWEEK,
http://www.informationweek.com/news/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=196901142
(last
visited Oct. 10, 2007).
77
Int’l Monetary Fund, Transcript of an IMF Book Forum—The World Is Flat: A Brief
History of the Twenty-First Century, Apr. 8, 2005, available at http://www.imf.org/
external/np/tr/2005/tr050408bf.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2007).
78
540 U.S. 398, 401 (2004) [hereinafter Trinko].
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the market.79 The Federal Communications Commission asserted
that Verizon breached its duty by inadequately providing access to
the customers of its CLEC competitors, one of which is AT&T.80
Trinko was an AT&T customer.81 Trinko alleged that Verizon
discouraged customers from becoming or remaining customers of
CLECs like AT&T, and claimed that Verizon’s breach of its duties
under the Telecommunications Act to grant access to AT&T
constituted an antitrust violation.82 While the Supreme Court
ultimately found that Verizon had no duty to license,83 it again
raises the question how the analysis of the case would have been
altered when viewed through the lenses of wikinomics.
Since its inception, companies have charged for
communications by telephones based on the length of time and
distance across which the call was made. However, this pricing
scheme might not last much longer. In 2003, Niklas Zennström
and Janus Friss founders of the file sharing application Kazaa,
launched Skype.84 Skype’s software harnesses the collective
computing power of peers, allowing them to speak with each other
free of charge via the Internet.85 Skype competes against existing
open Voice over Internet protocol service (“VoIP”) providers.86

79

See id.
See id. at 403, 413.
81
Id. at 404.
82
See id. at 404–05.
83
See id. at 415–16.
84
Skype, http://www.skype.com; About Skype, http://about.skype.com/; Jeremy
Caplan, Bringing TV to the Web, TIME, Mar. 1, 2007, available at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1595049,00.html (last visited Oct. 5,
2007).
85
Skype Help, http://support.skype.com/?_a=knowledgebase&_j=subcat&_i=3 (follow
link “What is Skype”).
86
VoIP allows consumers to make phone calls over the Internet by turning voices into
data packets that are sent down Internet networks and converted back into voices on the
other end. Anyone who subscribes to the service through a phone company or private
operator can receive unlimited local and long-distance phone calls, via the Internet—over
his personal computer, laptop, or PDA—with just a small microphone attachment. See
Federal Communications Commission Consumer Facts, Voice over Internet Protocol
(VoIP), http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/ consumerfacts/voip.pdf (last visited on Oct. 5, 2007). In
contrast, “Skype operates on a peer-to-peer model, rather than the more traditional serverclient model. The Skype user directory is entirely decentralised and distributed among
the nodes in the network, which means the network can scale very easily to large
80
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Skype’s
business
model
creates
a
self-sustaining
telecommunications system that requires no central capital
investment. Skype went from 100,000 to 100 million registered
users in two years, and was acquired by eBay for US$2.0 billion in
2005.87
Today, “Skype claims that about 30% of Skype accounts are
business accounts.”88 Internet communications in business reduce
costs and increase productivity within a company. It also promotes
collaboration among a company’s different groups that may be
located in different locations, and enhances the way a company
communicates with its suppliers, vendors, and customers. Skype’s
broad feature set of voice and video calling, conference calling,
instant messaging, and file transfer is applicable in many of these
situations.89 At present, every business and personal phone call to
anywhere in the world is as cheap as a local call.90 As consumers
get more choices, the competition will be such that the negative
effects of undertakings refusing access to CLECs like AT&T will
be diluted. “What phone companies will compete over, and charge
for, will be the the add-ons.”91 While customers may not pay for
calls, they will pay for premium services such as making calls to a
landline network or for voice and video messaging.
sizes . . . .” See Skype, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skype (last visited Oct. 5,
2007).
87
Nate Mook, eBay Acquires Skype for $2.6 Billion, BetaNews.com, Sept. 12, 2005,
http://www.betanews.com/
article/eBayAcquires_Skype_for_26_Billion/1126540985
(last visited Oct. 11, 2007); see Tom Sanders, Skype Signs Up 100 Millionth User,
Computing.co.uk, May 1, 2006, http://www.computing.co.uk/vnunet/news/2155074/
skype-signs-100-millionth-user (last visited Oct. 11, 2007). In February 2007, Skype
reported its 500 millionth user download. See Paul D. Kretkowski, Skype Roadmap 2007,
VOIP NEWS, Feb. 20, 2007, http://www.voip-news.com/interviews/skype-qa-oberg022007/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2007).
88
See Kretkowski, supra note 87.
89
“Skype already has more than 50 leading hardware manufacturers producing more
than 160 Skype Certified devices and accessories, including desktop Internet phones,
cordless phones, headsets and WiFi phones. In addition, Skype for Windows Mobile
works on more than 120 different Pocket PC and Smartphone devices. In fact, it has been
downloaded more than 5 million times, making it one of the most popular Windows
Mobile applications to date.” Id.
90
Voice Over IP, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voice_over_IP (last visited
on Oct. 6, 2007).
91
Posting of Bill Binning to Jaduka blog, http://blog.jaduka.com/archives/34-Its-theServices,-Stupid!.html (Feb. 27, 2007, 8:41 EST) (quoting FRIEDMAN, supra note 36).
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But even as peer-to-peer internet telephony wires consumers to
anyone in the world with a phone, the causeways of information
become ever wider. The WiFi92 revolution allows consumers to
use Skype on mobile devices.93 Yet even now, WiFi could be
made obsolete by the presence of WiMax94 processors which will
have the potential to cover a much greater range than WiFi—in the
order of several kilometres.95 This means that our mobile
communication lines may soon take place over peer-to-peer
network providers like Skype rather than LECs. But Skype is not
without its potential antitrust controversies. “Skype has been
criticized over its use of a proprietary protocol, instead of an open
standard . . . since this makes it much more difficult, if not
impossible, for other developers to interact with Skype.96 Some
have theorized that the decision was made to prevent competition
over business with SkypeOut,”97 which “allows Skype users to call
traditional telephone numbers, including mobile telephones, for a
fee.”98 While this potentially raises access concerns of its own, the
point remains that entry is free to all who can provide a new and
better alternative to traditional LECs.

92

WiFi “is a set of product compatibility standards for wireless local area networks
(“WLANs”) based on the IEEE 802.11 specifications. . . . Wi-Fi enables a person with a
wireless-enabled computer or personal digital assistant (“PDA”) to connect to the Internet
when in proximity of an access point. The geographical region covered by one or several
access
points
is
called
a
hotspot.”
Thefreelibrary.com,
Wi-Fi,
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Wi-Fi-a0163332784 (last visited Oct. 11, 2007).
“[H]otspots only have an effective range of 300 metres.” James Brown, VNUNET, Mar.
16, 2006, http://www.vnunet.com/computing/analysis/2152089/wifi-provide-answer.
93
Compare Accessories and Devices, http://skype.com/help/accessories/devices.html#
wifiphone (last visited Oct. 12, 2007).
94
“WiMAX is an acronym that stands for Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave
Access, a certification mark for products that pass conformity and interoperability tests
for the IEEW 802.16 standards. WiMAX is a standards-based wireless technology that
provides high-throughput broadband connections over long distances.” Human Law
Mediation: WiFi on the Rise, but WiMax Poised to Take Over, http://www.humanlaw.org/humanlaw/2006/03/wifi_on_the_ris.html (Mar. 17, 2006).
95
Id.
96
Skype, Wikipedia, supra note 86.
97
Id.
98
Id.
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3. Magill
In Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) v. Comm’n of the European
Comtys (“Magill”), three broadcasting companies were dominant
over the listings of its own programs.99 This dominance was
achieved through questionable copyright protection granted in the
United Kingdom and Ireland for TV listings.100 “When Magill
started to publish comprehensive weekly listings for all three
stations, each TV station successfully sued for copyright
infringement.”101 Each station had refused to license its listing
information to anyone.102 The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”)
found that the refusal to license “amounted to an abuse of a
dominant position over the programme information.”103
The copyright for the non-creative listing of facts allowed each
station a monopoly over the use of those facts or lists.104 Under
E.U. law, the Court of Justice cannot rule on the correctness of
Member State copyright laws unless that Member State protection
falls within the subject matter for an E.U. copyright directive.105
Copyright in television listings had not been the subject of any
E.U. directive. But many people think that the Court of Justice
viewed the British and Irish protection for television listings as
suspect, and used a novel application of competition law to do
indirectly what it could not do directly.106 The Court held that:
99

See Case C-241/91, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) v. Comm’n of the European
Comtys., 1995 E.C.R. I-743 [hereinafter Magill]; KORAH, supra note 57, at 138.
100
Magill, 1995 E.C.R. I-743.
101
KORAH, supra note 57, at 138.
102
Id. at 139. The stations had only provided programme information to daily
newspapers on a limited basis. Magill, 1995 E.C.R. I-743 at para. 9.
103
KORAH, supra note 57, at 138.
104
Id.
105
As the ECJ in Magill noted, “In the absence of Community standardization or
harmonization of laws, determination of the conditions and procedures for granting
protection of an intellectual property right is admittedly a matter for national rules and the
exclusive right of reproduction forms part of the author’s rights, with the result that
refusal to grant a licence, even if it is the act of an undertaking holding a dominant
position, cannot in itself constitute abuse of a dominant position.” Magill, 1995 E.C.R. I743 at para. 49 (citing judgment in Case C-238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd.,
1988 E.C.R. I-6211 at paras 7–8).
106
Duncan Curley, Balancing Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Law in a
Dynamic, Knowledge-Based European Economy, in THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
DEBATE: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 220, (Edward
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•

The television stations were the only sources of
the basic information,107 their refusal to supply
this information prevented the appearance of a
new product which the stations did not offer
and for which there was constant consumer
demand;108
• There was no justification for the refusal;109
and
• The stations reserved to themselves the
secondary market of weekly TV guides, by
excluding all competition on that market.110
Television stations, whether broadcast, cable, or satellite, need
television listings to serve their consumers. To the extent that a
competitor wants to use those listing, the market would be defined
again as the station’s TV listings. If the listings were still
protected by copyright, then stations would continue to have
dominance even if peer production of video alternatives were
rampant. Thus, on the sui generis facts of Magill, the result would
be the same.
However, the potential role of peer production in the
production of video products that can compete with traditional
television shows is strong. YouTube and similar sites promise to
provide an Internet-based alternative to local television stations.111
Elgar 2006) (noting that “(i)n consequence of the ruling in Magill and the particular facts
of that case, there was much subsequent debate in the literature about whether
‘exceptional circumstances’ might apply to force compulsory licensing of IPRs in
circumstances where IPRs were thought to be undeserving of legal protection, without
the requirement to demonstrate that other unilateral conduct as well”).
107
Magill, supra note 99, at para. 53.
108
Id. at para. 54.
109
Id. at para. 55.
110
Id. The European Court of Justice’s judgment was extremely vague. The precise
scope of “exceptional circumstances” remains unknown even to this day. Whether this
was because of a shrew desire to preserve wiggle room to refine the conditions for access
or otherwise will remain for all time, a matter for academic speculation. See KORAH,
supra note 57, at 139.
111
According to Wikipedia, “YouTube is a popular video sharing website where users
can
upload,
view,
and
share
video
clips.”
YouTube,
Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Youtube (last visited Oct. 6, 2007) [hereinafter YouTube,
Wikipedia]. “Videos can be rated, and the average rating and the number of times a
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YouTube was started as an “angel-funded enterprise” in garage
with an initial investment of US$3.5 million.112 In November
2006, Google announced that it had reached a deal to acquire the
company for US$1.65 billion in Google’s stock.113 “YouTube’s
pre-eminence in the online video market is staggering.”114 While it
has some copyrighted works uploaded in full without permission,
its main attraction are the massive independently produced videos
of members of the public, or excerpts chosen and edited by
members of the public of copyrighted works. This creative force
has been unleashed and will be difficult to stop. It has already
created a huge audience that otherwise would most likely would be
watching traditional television programs. As the sophistication of
these public creators increases, the product will improve. We
might see sophisticated shorts and, perhaps, full length programs
that will cut sharply into the market share of traditional shows.115
As a mark of its importance in setting the tone for the way media
will be consumed in future, YouTube was named Time magazine’s

video has been watched are both published.” YouTube, Simple English Wikipedia,
http://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/YouTube (last visited Oct. 11, 2007) [hereinafter
YouTube, Simple Wikipedia]. The New York Times reported that Hollywood producers
are already placing a full television series, “Quarterlife,” on MySpace, another free
access community site. Michael Ciepley, Show Series to Originate on MySpace, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/13/business/
media/13quarterlife.html (describing the show as “a regular television series, made by
network-caliber writers, directors and production crews”).
112
See YouTube, Wikipedia, supra note 111.
113
Google closes $A2b YouTube deal, REUTERS, Nov. 14, 2006, available at
http://www.theage.com.au/news/Busness/Google-closes-A2b-YouTubedeal/2006/11/14/1163266548827.html.
114
“According to a July 16, 2006 survey, 100 million clips are viewed daily on
YouTube, with an additional 65,000 new videos uploaded per 24 hours. The site has
almost 20 million visitors each month, according to Nielsen/NetRatings; . . . [a]ccording
to the website Hitswise.com[sic], YouTube commands up to 64% of the UK online video
market.” Mysite.cc, http://www.mysite.cc/ (quoting http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
YouTube) (last visited Oct. 11, 2007). See also USATODAY.com, YouTube Serves up 100
Million Videos a Day Online, REUTERS, July 16, 2006, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-07-16-youtube-views_x.htm? (last viewed
Oct. 6, 2007); YouTube, Wikipedia, supra note 111.
115
BBC Joins Forces with YouTube, ZDNet UK, REUTERS, Mar. 2, 2007, available at
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/internet/0,1000000097,39286149,00.htm (BBC director-general
Mark Thompson noted that “[i]t’s essential that the BBC embraces new ways of reaching
wider audiences with nonexclusive partnerships such as these . . .”).

LIM_121307_FINAL

316

12/13/2007 9:57:01 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 18

“Invention of the Year” for 2006.116 With the emergence of digital
video on demand,117 the need to rely on national broadcasters, and
consequently, their indulgence in providing access to their
television listings, will be obviated. As long as this emerging trend
of independent global network of content providers sustains itself,
Magill-type cases will not likely re-emerge.
4. FairPlay
Apple developed the iPod, a portable music player, and iTunes,
an online music store.118 Apple has sold more than three billion
songs on iTunes,119 and accounted for 82% of legal downloads in
the U.S. in May 2005.120 Apple has sold over 100 million iPods,121
and has over 70% market share of all mp3 players.122 It agreed to
provide FairPlay,123 its digital rights management (“DRM”)
protection,124 to the big-four music companies in order to entice
116

Lev Grossman, Best Inventions 2006: Invention of the Year, TIME, Nov. 13, 2006, at
62, available at http://www.time.com/time/2006/techguide/bestinventions/inventions/
youtube.html.
117
See Video on demand, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Video_on_demand
(last visited Oct. 23, 2007).
118
Apple – iPod + iTunes, http://www.apple.com/itunes (last visited Oct. 7, 2007).
119
iTunes Store Tops Three Billion Songs, http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/
07/31itunes.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).
120
MacDailyNews, Apple’s iTunes Music Store Passes 430 Million Downloads, Market
Share Increases to 82-Percent in May, http://macdailynews.com/index.php/weblog/
comments/5967/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).
121
Apple Introduces New iPod Classic, http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/09/
05classic.html (last visisted Oct. 6, 2007).
122
Phillip Cruz, U.S. Top Selling Computer Hardware for January 2007,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Mar. 13, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
conewsstory&refer=conews&tkr=AAPL:U.S.&sid=ap0bqJw2VpwI (last visited Oct. 6,
2007).
123
FairPlay, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FairPlay (last visited Oct. 23,
2007).
124
Digital rights management technologies attempt to control use of digital media by
preventing access, copying or conversion to other formats. Digital rights management
systems have received some international legal backing by implementation of the 1996
WIPO Copyright Treaty. See http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html
(last visited Oct. 6, 2007). Article 11 of the Treaty requires contracting parties to enact
laws against DRM circumvention. Id. The U.S. has implemented the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA), while Europe has implemented the Directive 2001/29/EC
(directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the
information society), which requires E.U. member states to implement legal protections
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them to make their music content available on iTunes. However,
“Apple’s tight control over FairPlay” has prevented its users from
playing files “bought from other online services.”125 It also
prevents iTunes rivals from providing interoperable content.126
The French enterprise Virgin Media accused Apple of abusing its
dominance by refusing to license its FairPlay digital rights
management system in France.127 It claimed that in order to be a
viable provider of online music, it had to be able to sell to iPod
users.128 This meant access to FairPlay.
In November 2004, the French Competition Commission
rejected the complaint.129 It first held that because the market was
rapidly expanding, new competitors were entering, prices were
decreasing, and functionalities increasing, present market share did
not reflect actual market power.130 Second, it held that FairPlay
was not indispensable.131 There were other uses of pay-per-song
and several other music portable players on the market. Finally,
the DRM was easily circumvented by burning the song onto a
compact disc, and ripping it into another format.132 In the U.S., a
for technological prevention measures. See Digital Millenium Copyright Act of 1998,
available at http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf; Council Directive
2001/29/EC, para. 47, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 (EC), OJ 2001 L167/10 (Westlaw).
Wikipedia describes digital rights management as follows: “Digital rights management
(DRM) is an umbrella term that refers to access control technologies used by publishers
and other copyright holders to limit usage of digital media or devices. It may also refer to
restrictions associated with specific instances of digital works or devices. To some
extent, DRM overlaps with copy protection, but DRM is usually applied to creative
media (music, films, etc.) whereas copy protection typically refers to software.” Digital
rights management, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_rights_management
(last visited Oct. 23, 2007).
125
Natali Helberger, Virgin Media versus iTunes, 2 INDICARE MONITOR 16, 16 (2005),
available at http://www.indicare.org/tiki-read_article.php?articleID=150 (last visited Oct.
2, 2007).
126
See id.
127
See id. at 17.
128
See id.
129
See Didier Deneuter, No Abuse of Market Dominance by Apple According to the
French Competition Council, EUROJURIS INTERNATIONAL, Dec. 12, 2004,
http://www.eurojuris.net/eng/article-detail.asp?ArticleId=206.
130
See Helberger, supra note 125, at 18.
131
Id.
132
See Terrence O’Brien, The New Weapon Against Online Music Theft?, SWITCHED,
Aug. 20, 2007, http://www.switched.com/2007/08/20/a-new-weapon-aganst-onlinemusic-theft/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2007). In March 2006, the “[French Senate passe[d] a
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class action suit was brought against Apple in the U.S. District
Court of Northern California.133 It was accused of leveraging its
monopoly on the iTunes market to thwart competition in its iPod
market.134
Pandora and Last.fm are potential alternatives to the DRM
protected music from iTunes. These are essentially automated
music recommendation and Internet radio services.135 “Users
begin by entering a song or artist that they enjoy, and the service
responds by playing selections that the program thinks are
musically similar.”136 “Songs played are added to a log from
which personal top artist/track bar charts and musical
recommendations are calculated.”137
Users are then able to provide feedback on the
individual song choices . . . which the system takes
into account for future selection. Over 400 different
musical attributes or genes are considered when
selecting the next song. These 400 attributes are
combined into larger groups called focus traits.
There are 2,000 focus traits.138
watered[-]down DRM bill” forcing suppliers of DRMs to provide information necessary
for interoperability. Marc Perton, French Senate Passes Watered Down DRM Bill,
ENGADGET, May 11, 2006, http://www.engadget.com/2006/05/11/french-senate-passeswaterd-down-drm-bill/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2007).
133
Tucker v. Apple Computer, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
134
See id. at 1094; see also Nancy Gohring, Apple faces US lawsuit over iTunes-iPod
link, INFOWORLD, Jan. 2, 2007, http://www.infoworld.com/article/07/01/02/
HNapplelawsuit_1.html (“Apple faces a lawsuit in the U.S. . . . over tying its iTunes
music store to the iPod digital music player. . . . The suit was filed by a user, Melanie
Tucker, and seeks class-action status. It alleges that Apple violates antitrust laws by
refusing to allow music bought in its iTunes store to be played on any digital music
player besides the iPod. It also charges Apple with not making it clear to customers that
music from the iTunes store and the iPod are incompatible with music and devices
offered by other companies. The suit asks that Apple be forbidden to continue to support
the exclusive tie-in between iTunes and the iPod and that Apple pay damages to anyone
who has bought an iPod or music from the iTunes store after April 28, 2003.”).
135
See Last.fm, http://www.last.fm (last visited Oct. 4, 2007); Pandora,
http://pandora.com (last visited Oct. 4, 2007).
136
Pandora Users Groups at Last.fm, http://www.last.fm/group/Pandora+Users (last
visited Oct. 4, 2007).
137
This is termed “automatic track logging scrobbling.” Last.FM, Wikipedia.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Last.fm (last visited Oct. 4, 2007).
138
See Pandora Users Groups, supra note 136.
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These allow consumers to get the songs they want, as well as
other similar samplings which they may enjoy for free anywhere
and anytime they are connected to the Internet. With increasing
penetration of WiFi and WiMax, consumers listening are able to
enjoy the selection and convenience of songs downloaded from
iTunes while on the move in their cities without any
anticompetitive concerns with respect to interoperability.
B. The Competitive Process in a Collaborative World
New low-cost collaborative infrastructures allow competitors
and entrants to access markets in ways that only large corporations
could manage in the past. The information and tools are available
with a small amount of capital—dominance has been
downsized.139 Indeed, as a growing number of firms see the
benefits of mass collaboration, this new way of organizing could
eventually displace traditional corporate structures as the
economy’s primary engine of wealth creation. However, two
issues should be resolved. First, it may be argued that evidence of
change in the way IP markets operate is scanty. This suggests that
the examples cited earlier are isolated occurrences or that they may
only have minimal impact on the market power and strategies of
dominant undertakings. Second, even if wikinomics could have a
significant impact on analysis at the Interface, the business model

139

For example, for a fee, SalesForce.com gives small and medium enterprises
(“SMEs”) access to a library of Web-based business applications, which can be tapped
into online to run their businesses. See On-Demand CRM Applications,
http://www.salesforce.com/products/appexchange-applications/ (last visited Oct. 3,
2007). These applications operate like traditional software programs and can handle a
wide range of business tasks. The big difference is that these management tools are
stored remotely on the SalesForce.com platform. Because they are delivered over the
Internet and written in standard Web formats, they are accessible to anyone who has an
Internet connection and are easily interoperable with any business. Microsoft has taken
notice. The New York Times reported on 9 November 2005 that several Microsoft
internal memos from senior executives suggested that “Microsoft must fundamentally
alter its business or face being at a significant competitive disadvantage to a growing
array of companies offering Internet services. . . . [A few days later], Microsoft . . .
announced that it would offer two new services—Windows Live and Office Live . . .”
which are essentially Business Web versions of its more popular products. John Markoff,
Internet Services Crucial, Microsoft Memos Say, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, at C5,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/09/technology/09soft.html.
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could upset the traditional IP mechanism of rewarding innovation
through temporary exclusivity.
1. Where Has Peer Production Succeeded Commercially?
An argument may be validly raised that the impact of peer
production on traditional dominance in the market is speculative.
For example, open source has not seen significant success in
personal computer desktop software so far.140 Market shares have
not changed much.141 While there have been reliable open source
software alternatives in major application software categories, it
has proved difficult to gain any relevant market share from the
dominating Microsoft products.142 The short answer is that
changes in market behavior take time and happens in markets with
suitable conditions.
When computers were first introduced into offices, some
expected a significant boost in productivity.143 However, Professor
Paul David explained such a lag by pointing to a historical
precedent.144 He noted that while the light bulb was invented in
1879, it took several decades for electrification to permeate the
industrial process.145 Only when there was a critical mass of
experienced factory architects, electrical engineers, and managers
who understood the complementarities among the production line
did electrification really deliver a productivity breakthrough.146 In

140

Mikko Välimäki & Ville Oksanen, The Impact of Free and Open Source Licensing
on Operating System Software Markets, 22 TELEMATICS AND INFORMATICS 97, 98 (2005).
141
“If one uses searches made on Google as an indicator, during June 2001 and October
2003, a steady 1% of all searches came from computers using Linux as the operating
system. The market share of Mac OS has been around 3–4% while other non-Windows
operating systems gaining another 4%. The rest of Google queries, that is over 90%,
were made from computers running Microsoft Windows.” Id. at 99 n.1.
142
MIKKO VÄLIMÄKI, THE RISE OF OPEN SOURCE LICENSING: A CHALLENGE TO THE USE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY 19 (Fin. Turre Publ’g 2005),
available at http://pub.turre.com/openbook_valimaki.pdf.
143
See Paul A. David, The Dynamo and the Computer: An Historical Perspective on the
Modern Productivity Paradox, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 355, 355 (1990). The noted economist
Robert Solow quipped that “[w]e see the computers everywhere but in the productivity
statistics.” Id.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 356.
146
See id. at 358.

LIM_121307_FINAL

2008]

12/13/2007 9:57:01 PM

IP, PEER PRODUCTION & MARKET DOMINANCE

321

the same way, while the impact of wikinomics is already beginning
to be felt, changes in antitrust analysis may only be present
necessary in limited technology and telecommunications markets.
It may take some years before there is a critical mass of business
models based on peer collaboration for antitrust analysis as a
whole to be altered significantly.
Yet it is significant that wikinomics has already found a willing
audience in the governmental IP framework. The U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (“USPTO”) will soon begin experimenting with
a wikinomics approach to reviewing patent applications.147 The
Community Patent Review project aims to create an online system
for peer review of patents.148 “It will support a network of experts
to advise the Patent Office on prior art as well as to assist with
patentability determinations.”149 By using social software, such as
social reputation, collaborative filtering and information
visualization tools, this project aims to “make it easier to protect
the inventor’s investment while safeguarding the marketplace of
ideas.”150 While there remains a risk that the system could be
gamed, an opaque patent review system would likely be more
susceptible to abuse than one where a community of peers can
review and rate each others comments on a given patent
application in an open and transparent forum.151
147

Posting of Anthony D. Williams to Wikinomics: The Blog, A Wikinomics Approach
to the Patent System, http://www.wikinomics.com/blog/index.php/2007/03/05/awikinomics-approach-to-the-patent-system/ (Mar. 5, 2007, 19:26 EST).
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id. “The quality of patents has sharply decreased as underpaid and overwhelmed
patent examiners struggle with a backlog of over 600,000 applications and growing.” Id.
“Companies try to patent things that other people or companies will unintentionally
infringe and then they wait for those companies to successfully bring products to the
marketplace.” Id. Undertakings who file these patents and extract license fees from
successful businesses play the patent system like a lottery. Id. “The real danger is that
these questionable patents will end up driving up the costs of innovation by generating an
increasing number of lawsuits, or threatened lawsuits, that genuinely innovative
companies cannot avoid.” Id. The problem is so endemic in fields like software and
electronics, “low-quality patents have become a serious drag on the technological and
scientific progress that the patent system was designed to promote.” Id. See also U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 2007–
2012 STRATEGIC PLAN 13 (2007) (“We believe that partnership with stakeholders is
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But the progressive march of wikinomics is not without its
opponents. There are at least three reasons why it might be
derailed. First, intrinsic to peer production is a continuing supply
of willing collaborators. Many open source software collaborators
are driven by a desire to counterbalance the dominance of software
corporations such as Microsoft and the desire to be part of creating
a better system. Idealism alone limits the quality and quantity of
alternatives available to consumers. In order for peer production to
become a fully sustainable alternative to current business models,
it will need to incorporate elements of a structured system of
financial rewards in the way forward thinking organizations such
as Skype and P&G have done.152 Second, a large part by
successful commercial models of peer collaboration relies in part
of the use of copyrighted works. The trend then hinges on whether
the law will provide for continued use of these works in some
fashion through doctrines such as fair use or whether copyright
owners will succeed in seeking to curtail use of their works. For
instance, in March 2007, Viacom filed a $1 billion lawsuit against

crucial to defining, in a collaborative manner, solutions that will benefit the entire IP
system. We also believe that such partnerships can offer keys to global IP solutions, as
American inventors, entrepreneurs, and businesses have global issues to consider. As an
example, in fiscal year 2006, the U.S.PTO cooperated with a private sector-led group that
chose to focus on so-called ‘peer review’ as a possible means of improving the quality of
patent application packages received by the USPTO. Private sector-initiated and -led
efforts may provide the USPTO with important data and feedback that will help us, as
stewards of the public trust, improve patent, trademark, and other IP systems for the
benefit of all.”) (emphasis added), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/com/strat2007/stratplan2007-2012.pdf.
152
Another successful model of peer production is Google. See David Post & Bradford
C. Brown, On the Horizon: ‘Peer Production’ Promises to Leap in Importance,
INFORMATIONWEEK, Jan. 2, 2002 (“Google . . . shows another side of peer production. It
has become, almost overnight, the gold standard for search engines. What makes Google
different from and better than other search engines is that it evaluates the usefulness of
each of the billions of Web pages out there and the relevance of each page to a particular
query by counting and analyzing the links leading into the page in question. In other
words, it lets the network do the hard work of ranking Web pages. It’s as though
everyone who builds a Web page and links to other pages is working for Google, helping
it
provide
better
service
to
its
customers.”),
available
at
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=6500771.

LIM_121307_FINAL

2008]

12/13/2007 9:57:01 PM

IP, PEER PRODUCTION & MARKET DOMINANCE

323

YouTube and Google, alleging massive copyright infringement.153
Viacom said in its complaint:
YouTube’s brazen disregard of the intellectualproperty laws fundamentally threatens not just
plaintiffs but the economic underpinnings of one of
the most important sectors of the United States
economy.154
....
YouTube has deliberately chosen not to take
reasonable precautions to deter the rampant
infringement on its site . . . because YouTube
directly profits from the availability of popular
infringing works on its site, it has decided to shift
the burden entirely onto copyright owners to
monitor the YouTube site on a daily or hourly basis
to detect infringing videos.155
Third, the progressive march of wikinomics rests in large part
on a presumption that the Internet remains affordable for the large
body of collaborative creators. Like the media industries,
telecommunications firms “need to recoup their investments in
maintaining
and
upgrading
the
telecommunications
infrastructure.”156 Telecommunications firms may charge fees in
exchange for giving faster service. Users who are used to fast
service might become disaffected with collaborative sites that are
too slow. Thus, those sites might lose both creators and viewers.
On the other hand, the slower sites should have a market of people
who cannot afford the faster service. There is no reason to think
that those who cannot afford the faster service will no longer
participate in the collaborative creative process or view it.
This tiered Internet with different levels of service has created
a strong debate on the merits “net neutrality.” Some have

153

Complaint, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 1:2007cv02103 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
13, 2007), available at http://ngdaly.googlepages.com/ViacomvYouTube.pdf.
154
Id. at para. 2.
155
Id. at para. 6.
156
TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 273.
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predicted very dire consequences.157 This structure underlying
much of the technological progress we take for granted today may
collapse and choke the lifeblood out of the current and future
collaborative creative process afforded by cheap and ready access
to technological infrastructure.158 If it does, society may have to
turn to antitrust and competition law for a possible solution in the
form of the essential facilities doctrine.159

157
Id. As Don Tapscott and Anthony Williams dramatically put it, “[i]f Yahoo pays the
freight, BellSouth users will find Yahoo’s search engine works faster and better than
Google’s. So, in effect, BellSouth becomes a gatekeeper for the types of services that
thrive on the Internet. . . . This is not just a war against the open Internet; it’s a war
against economic development, a war against competitiveness, and a war against
innovation. In short, it’s a war against the future.” Id. at 273. In the wake of this
statement, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission has alleged that
Google has deceived consumers by not differentiating between its organic search results
and those which are being displayed because Google has received payment from an
advertiser. See John Collins, Google Antitrust Case Opens in Australia, IRISH TIMES,
Sept.
11,
2007,
available
at
http://contentagenda.com/articleXml/
LN667905952.html?industryid=45174.
158
Here an irony may be observed. The Internet was created to facilitate the transfer of
information, offering a communications network that could potentially survive a nuclear
war. Yet it remains pitifully vulnerable to technological bottlenecks which could be put
in place by service providers seeking to profit by auctioning information to the highest
bidders.
159
The Essential Facilities Doctrine (“EFD”) grew out of cases where a vertically
integrated owner had exclusive control over some facility, and used that control to gain
advantage over competitors in an adjacent or downstream market. Herbert Hovenkamp et
al., Unilateral Refusals to License, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 10 (2006). It was
first discussed in the U.S. in United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass’n, in which a set of
railroads formed a joint venture owning a key bridge across the Mississippi River and
excluded non-member competitors. 224 U.S. 383 (1912). In the E.C., the EFD was first
discussed in Sea Containers v. Stena Sealink, where a port owner was prohibited from
imposing competitive constraints on downstream customers. 1994 O.J. (L 15) 8 (1994).
The doctrine has also surfaced in cases involving such “bottleneck” inputs as sports
stadiums, warehouse spaces, and newspaper distribution systems. However, recent cases
have focused on technological knowledge for access to networks. These include physical
networks like electricity or telecommunications, where there are clear elements of natural
monopoly and the presence of explicit regulation, as well as “virtual” networks. Richard
N. Langlois, Technological Standards, Innovation, and Essential Facilities Toward a
Schumpeterian Post-Chicago Approach 4–5 (U. Conn. Dep’t Econ., Working Paper No.
1999-07, 1999), available at http://www.econ.uconn.edu/working/1999-07.pdf.
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2. Is Peer Production a Threat to the IP Mechanism of
Rewarding Innovation Through Temporary Exclusivity?
There is a view that “if innovators are not going to be
financially rewarded, the incentive for path-breaking innovation
will eventually dry up, as will the money for deep R & D that is
required to drive [technological] progress.”160 To this concern two
responses may be given. First, peer production offers an open
technological infrastructure.161 Most open source solutions like
Linux provide the basic infrastructure on which software
developers can build applications and businesses.162 It allows
commercial entities to compete in areas to which they can add
value without being inhibited by lack of access to basic
technological infrastructure. Competitors will still have to develop
a unique product or service, and a unique way to apply technology
to areas of core value. This means competitors will still need
proprietary insights, innovations and proprietary software tools to
build unique products or services. As a consequence, durable
competitive advantages in R&D-intensive industries will still be
rooted in the growth of deep domain-specific knowledge.
IBM shows how IP can be treated like a mutual fund—a
balanced portfolio of some protected and shared IP assets.163 “At a
160

FRIEDMAN, supra note 36, at 109. For example, “Microsoft’s success in creating the
standard PC operating system produced the bankroll that allowed Microsoft to spend
billions of dollars on R & D to develop Microsoft Office, a whole suite of applications”
that it can now sell for a few hundred dollars. Id. As Craig Mundie, Microsoft’s Chief
Research and Strategy Officer, put it: “The virtuous cycle of innovation, reward,
reinvestment, and more innovation is what has driven all big breakthroughs in our
industry. The software business as we have known it is a scale economic business. You
spend a ton of money up front to develop a software product, and then the marginal cost
of producing each one is very small, but if you sell a lot of them, you make back your
investment and then plough profits back into developing the next generation. But when
you insist that you cannot charge for software, you can only give it away, you take the
software business away from being a scale economic business.” Id.
161
Id. at 91 (“Commercial software companies have to start operating further up the
[software] stack to differentiate themselves. . . . The open source community is basically
focusing on infrastructure.”) (quoting Jack Messman, chairman of Novell, Inc.).
162
TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 91–92. See also Linux,
http://www.linux.org.
163
Id. at 26, 120. “For example starting in 1999, more than a dozen pharmaceutical
firms abandoned their proprietary R&D projects to support open collaborations such as
the SNP Consortium and the Alliance for Cellular Signaling. Both projects aggregate
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time when reliability and trust were the big question marks
surrounding Linux, IBM indemnified client risk.”164 “Because it
was reliable and free, Linux became a useful operating system for
computers hosting Web servers, and ultimately databases, and
today many companies consider Linux an enterprise software
keystone.”165 Linux offers a viable platform uniquely tailored to
business needs for 20% of the cost of proprietary operating
systems.166
A company that was proprietary, insular, and
vertically integrated fifteen years ago now partners
extensively with the open source community and is
considered a positive force for collaboration and
openness. IBM enjoys the goodwill of thousands of
independent and corporate developers who are
committed to the Linux vision and community
growth. IBM’s partnering and collaboration with
communities it does not directly control are
strategic tools competitors have yet to master.167
In doing so, IBM gained a viable alternative to the Windows
server on Intel-based platforms. Just as important, IBM has gained
experience and knowledge in a vital new model of value creation.
Today, Linux services and hardware represent billions of dollars in
revenue. IBM estimates it has saved nearly a billion dollars per
year compared to what it would have to spend on creating and
maintaining an operating system in-house.168 More than that,
supporting open source has enabled IBM to undercut competitors
who charge for proprietary operating system software. Though
Linux is free to use or modify, it has been embedded in all kinds of
profitable products and services developed by large companies like
genetic information culled from biomedical research in publicly accessible databases.
They also use their shared infrastructures to harness resources and insights from the forprofit and not-for-profit research worlds. Nobody gives up their potential patent right
over new end products, and by sharing some basic intellectual property the companies
bring products to market more quickly.” Id. at 27.
164
Id. at 82.
165
Id. at 24.
166
Id. at 81.
167
Id. at 82.
168
See id. at 78.
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BMW, IBM, Motorola, Philips, and Sony.169 Contributing to the
commons is not altruism. Rather, it promotes vibrant business
ecosystems that harness a shared foundation of technology and
knowledge to accelerate growth and innovation.
But in-house innovation alone will not be enough to survive in
a fast changing and intensely competitive economy. The speed
and complexity of change is such that no one firm can create all
the innovations needed to compete in information technology, or in
any other industry. With a little time and effort, most technology
can be invented around. Firms that make the boundaries of
innovation porous to peer collaboration have a better chance to
outperform competitors that rely solely on internal resources and
capabilities. As Joel Cawley, head of IBM’s strategic planning
unit, put it:
What we are seeing in so many different fields . . .
is that the next layers of technical innovation
involve the intersection of very advanced
specialities.
The cutting edge of technical
innovation in every field is increasingly
specialized. . . . Therefore to come up with any
valuable new breakthrough, you have to be able to
combine more and more of these increasingly
granular specialties. That is why collaboration is so
important.170
Between 2001 and 2006, the pace of innovation has doubled in
the pharmaceutical industry alone.171 When Procter & Gamble
(“P&G”) realized that its army of 7,500 researchers was no longer
enough to sustain its lead, it sourced 50% of its new product and
service ideas outside their payroll, including the InnoCentive

169

See id. at 65.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 36, at 439; see also TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at
297–98 n.6 (noting that “as global complexity increases so do the list of challenges we
face that are unsolvable by individual organizations acting alone. . . . There is simply no
end to the requirements or possibilities for innovation. These complex problems demand
cross-disciplinary and interorganizational solutions. Even comparatively simple products
are becoming more complex. All of this complexity is fueling an increase in the
requirement for openness and boundary-spanning collaborations”).
171
See TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 13.
170
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network.172 Ninety thousand scientists around the world are
collaborating “to solve tough R&D problems for a cash reward.”173
P&G thus posts “R&D problems on the InnoCentive Web site,
while ‘solvers’ submit their solutions in a bid to capture cash
prizes ranging from $5,000 to $100,000.”174 In 2006, “more than
35% of [P&G’s] products in market ha[d] elements that originated
from outside P&G . . . . And 45% of the initiatives in [its] product
development portfolio ha[d] key elements that were discovered
externally.”175 At P&G, R&D productivity had increased by
nearly 60%, while “R&D investment as a percentage of sales [wa]s
down from 4.8% in 2000 to 3.4% . . . “ in 2006.176 “Five years
after the company’s stock collapse[d] in 2000, [it] . . . doubled
[it’s] share price and ha[d] a portfolio of 22 billion-dollar
brands.”177 This shows that our increasingly complex and
interconnected world has made wikinomics not merely be an
intriguing alternative to current models of IP exploitation, but their
evolutionary successor.
III. CONCLUSION
In today’s IP markets, the war between stakeholders will be
less over prices and output as it will be over the ownership and
access to information. In this regard, it is important to recognize
that protection and expansion of IPRs are means of serving a wider
social purpose of promoting innovation, rather than satisfying an
economic end in themselves. Properly conceived, they are tools
for preserving and enhancing a system of free enterprise and free
competition. Nevertheless, IPRs improperly constructed or applied
172

Id. InnoCentive is an open innovation company that takes research and development
problems in the sciences, frames them as challenge problems, and opens them up for
anyone to solve them. They give cash awards for the best solutions to scientists who
meet the challenge criteria. See David Wessel, Prizes for Solutions to Problems Play
Valuable Role in Innovation, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Jan. 25, 2007, available at
http://webreprints.djreprints.com/1657770067525.html.
173
TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 13.
174
Id. at 98–99.
175
Larry Huston & Nabil Sakkab, Connect and Develop: Inside Procter & Gamble’s
New Model for Innovation, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2006, at 58 para. 15.
176
Id.
177
Id.
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may cumulatively yield unacceptably high social costs by
compromising the competitive process. As Don Tapscott and
Anthony D. Williams put it:
Of course, as authors and business people we
recognize that rewarding creativity and investment
is central to promoting innovation. In theory,
intellectual property law exists to do just that. But
expansion in the law’s breadth, scope, and term
over the last thirty years has resulted in an
intellectual property regime that is radically out of
line with modern technological, economic, and
social realities.
This threatens the chain of
creativity and innovation on which we (and future
generations) depend.
In today’s economy we need an intellectual
property system that rewards invention and
encourages openness—one that fuels private
enterprise and sustains the public domain.178
If the legal incentives provided by IPRs stimulate the firstcomer’s investments at the expense of second comers who wish to
make investments on follow-on applications, IP laws would have
traded one kind of market failure for another. This is the fear
competition authorities have.
However, wikinomics and the conditions that facilitate it are
ushering us toward a world where knowledge, market power, and
productive capability will be more dispersed than at any time in
our history—a world where innovation will be fast, fluid, and
persistently disruptive. Dominant undertakings which fail to grasp
this will find themselves cut off from collaborative networks that
are sharing, adapting, and updating knowledge to create value. But
the idea of monopoly power being broken by individual effort is
hardly new. The Roman Catholic Church had long been a
predominant source of biblical knowledge.179 Then, in 1522,
Martin Luther translated the New Testament from Greek to
178

TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 179.
See THE DICTIONARY OF BIBLE AND RELIGION, Bible Versions, 134, 135 (William H.
Gentz ed., 1986).
179
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vernacular, and suddenly, the common man had access to the Holy
Scriptures.180 This catalysed a huge incentive to read and find out
spiritual truths for themselves, and it in turn created the impetus
toward the development of the printing press.181
As Don Tapscott and Anthony D. Williams observed,
wikinomics
works best when at least three conditions are
present: 1) [t]he object of production is information
or culture, which keeps the cost of participation low
for contributors; 2) [t]asks can be chunked out into
bite-size pieces that individuals can contribute in
small increments and independently of other
producers. . . . .
This makes their overall
investment of time and energy minimal in relation
to the benefits they receive in return. And, finally,
3) [t]he costs of integrating those pieces into a
finished end product, including the leadership and
quality-control mechanisms, must be low.182
Collaborative networks will grow as they are free. Switching
costs are overcome by people who have a strong reason to do so.
When innovators give consumers a new way of connecting, they
will punch through any technical barrier. However, this may take
several years. Significant shifts in market share take time, as there
needs to be a critical mass for market tipping to occur.
While wikinomics has not yet generated sufficient examples to
justify an overhaul competition analytics in refusals to license
cases, the point remains that some competitors and entrants now
have easy access to business tools that only large undertakings
could afford a few years ago and is setting the stage for a
revolutionary change in the balance of power. This should be
taken into account in the analysis of the anticompetitive potential
of a refusal to license. As wikinomics penetrates the production
and sale of IP products and barriers to entry are lowered, it may
180

See THE NEW ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, Biblical Literature, Macropædia Volume
14, at 916 (15th ed. 1994).
181
See id.
182
TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 70.
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become increasingly more difficult to succeed in a complaint of
abuse of dominance or monopolization. As competition becomes
increasingly globalized, vague and interventionist competition
laws will repel investors who can move their businesses offshore
on short notice. In doing so, they will take with them invaluable
technology which will give national economies a much needed
edge.183 When the dust settles, a new legal architecture may
emerge that is better suited to vastly different economic realities of
information, and to the technology upon which it subsists.

183

See KORAH, supra note 57, at 172 (“I remain concerned that the EC position is in
many ways stricter than that in the U.S.. This may encourage firms to perform their
R&D and produce the results outside the Common Market, exporting the products to the
Common Market. This avoids the wider scope of Article 82 and the special
responsibility of dominant firms to give access to essential facilities.”). A recent
reminder of this came from a South Korean competition case against Microsoft.
Microsoft threatened to withdraw its Windows operating system from the Republic when
its national competition authority imposed an order requiring Microsoft to remove code
or redesign Windows uniquely for the Korean market. For reasons known best to itself,
Microsoft later decided otherwise. See South Korea Fines Microsoft $32m, BBC News,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4505698.stm (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).

